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The Effect on the Performance of Listed Family and Non-family Firms 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the ownership of public firms is 
related to accounting and market performance, comparing family and non-family listed firms. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use regression analysis, considering a sample of 
Portuguese family and non-family firms for the period between 1999 and 2010.  
Findings: Overall, the results show that family firms are older, are more indebted and have 
higher debt costs than non-family firms. However, they present lower levels of risk. The 
evidence suggests that family firms outperform non-family firms when we consider a market 
performance measure. The market performance of family-controlled firms is more sensitive to 
the crisis periods and age, compared to their counterparts. The empirical findings suggest that 
under economic adversity, the performance is especially compromised by the firms’ age.  
Research limitations/implications: A limitation of this study is the small size of the sample, 
which derives from the small size of the Portuguese stock market, the Euronext Lisbon. 
Originality/value: This paper offers some insights on the ownership of public firms and firm 
performance by investigating a small European economy. The study also contributes to the 
stream of firm performance, considering new independent variables as determinants of firm 
performance, such as operational risk.  Finally, the study examines the interaction between 
ownership and performance under both steady and adverse economic conditions, giving the 
opportunity to analyze whether firm performance differs according to market conditions.  
Keywords: Market performance, Accounting performance, Family firms 
Classification: Research Paper 
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1. Introduction 
Over decades, several studies document evidence that family firms are common in publically-
traded firms worldwide. La Porta et al. (1999) analyzed 27 countries, finding evidence that 
about 50% of firms in their sample were family-controlled. Faccio and Lang (2002) find that 
more than 60% of listed firms in France, Italy, and Germany are family firms. Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007) analyzed listed French firms and concluded that more than 60% of the firms 
are managed by founding families. Studies on the US document relatively lower percentage 
values for family firms, with Andersen and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006)i 
finding percentages of 35 and 37, respectively. As regards Portugal, Faccio and Lang (2002) 
find evidence that family firms constitute about 60.34% of firms sampled and that in about 
50% of the family firms, the controlling owner is in management.  
Other studies centre on the main determinants of firm performance, particularly the 
accounting (Allouche et al., 2008; Smith, 2008; Nunes et al., 2012) and the market 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Pérez-González, 2006; Martínez et al., 2007; Sraer 
and Thesmar, 2007; Zhou, 2012). Although they focus on the effect of liquidity on firm 
performance (Deloof, 2003; Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006; Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006; Moreno 
et al., 2010) and on the relationship between debt and firm performance (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Chan et al., 2003; La Rocca et al., 2011, Moreno and Castillo, 2011), they did not 
examine the effects of operational risk and generalized economic adversity on the firms 
performance. 
In this context, our study aims to investigate whether family firms outperform non-
family counterparts, considering both accounting and market measures of firm performance as 
well as to analyze the firms’ performance, conditioned by the financial and economic crisis, in 
order to test whether family firms are higher performers than their counterparts even in 
recession periods, considering a sample made up of the 58 Portuguese non-financial firms 
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listed on Euronext Lisbon for the period 1999 to 2010. From the full sample, 35 firms were 
classified as family firms (about 60%) and 23 as non-family firms.  
This study contributes to the existing literature on the ownership of public firms and 
firm performance by investigating a small European economy. More specifically, it examines 
the performance of family firms in the context of Portugal. The history, capital market, and 
characteristics of businesses in this continental European country differ greatly from English-
speaking countries, where most studies on family firms have been conducted. The study also 
contributes to the stream of firm performance, considering new independent variables as 
determinants of firm performance, such as the operational risk.  Finally, the study examines 
the interaction between ownership and performance under both steady and adverse economic 
conditions. Analyzing periods of financial boom and of recession separately gives the 
opportunity to analyze whether firm performance differs according to market conditions. The 
results suggest that the influence of risk on firms’ performance is different between family 
and non-family firms, but only for a performance measure. The evidence proposes that, under 
adverse economic conditions, performance is particularly affected by the firm’s debt level. 
Overall, the empirical findings support the view that family firms outperform non-family 
firms. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, the variables and 
the method of analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the research results. Finally, section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Family Firms, Nom-family Firms and Performance 
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One difficulty in this sort of study is the definition of family firms (FF) and non-family firms 
(NFF). Different studies have used different classifications of FF (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 
2010). Most definitions include three main dimensions: families holding a significant part of 
the capital; family members retaining significant control over the firm and family members 
holding top management positions (Villalonga and Amit, 2006)ii. For example, Westhead et 
al. (2001) based their FF definition on the extent to which a firm is managed by members 
from a single dominant family group, with the firm being classified as FF if the family hold 
more than 50% of the shares. Anderson and Reeb (2003) use the percentage of equity owned 
by the founding family and the presence of family members on the board of directors, thus 
subscribing to a hybrid view of ownership and board control. Zahra (2005) asked, in a survey 
targeting a group of 2,000 US companies, whether firms were family owned. 
Following La Porta et al. (2000) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), we define FF as those 
in which the founding family or a family member controlled 20% or more of the equity, and 
was involved in the top management of the firm.  
The arguments on the performance of FF compared to NFF are supported on the 
literature on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) and on corporate 
governance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen 
(1986), agency costs diminish a firm’s value. However, when the ownership and control of a 
firm are held by the same party, the agency costs associated with conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetries draw back (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consequently, FF have 
incentives to reduce agency conflicts and maximize firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
Higher levels of family firms’ performance might occur from the better alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers (Andersen and Reeb, 2003). Anderson et al. (2003) state 
that FF present fewer agency conflicts between equity and debt than non-family counterparts, 
reducing agency costs that might lead to higher levels of performance. In addition, family 
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shareholders have long-term outlooks and implement optimal investment policies over the 
long run, which results in improved performance (Stein, 1989). In line with this argument, 
James (1999) concludes that FF invest more efficiently than NFF because the family wants to 
pass the firm onto succeeding generations and Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) argue that 
the long-term investments of family-controlled firms grow from specific governance 
conditions and produce competitive asymmetries, which create capabilities that are 
sustainable. 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) analyze the performance of French FF over the period 1994-
2000, finding that FF outperform other firms. Their results are in line with those of Anderson 
and Reeb (2003), who analyze the relationship between founding-family ownership and firm 
performance in the US market, concluding that FF perform better than non-family ones. More 
precisely, they find that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with 
outside CEOs, suggesting that family ownership is an elective organizational structure. 
Scholes et al. (2012) investigate listed family firms in the UK between 2007 and 2009, 
finding that FF have superior profitability and considerably less debt than their counterparts, 
but have a lower growth rate. Allouche et al. (2008) find evidence of better performance 
among Japanese FF and other authors find evidence of FF higher performance in advanced 
and competitive economies (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Essen et al., 
2011). Moreover, some literature documents the success of FF in markets considered as weak 
and developing institutional environments (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that FF do well in underdeveloped capital markets (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 
2001), weak formal protection for minority investors (Burkart et al., 2003), and poor 
commercial law (Gilson, 2007), which might be our case, as we focus on a small European 
economy.  
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However, some prior literature suggests that FF can lead to poorer firm performance 
than NFF. Fama and Jensen (1985) argue that large concentrated stockholders such as 
founding families may derive greater benefits from following objectives such as technological 
innovation, firm growth, or firm survival than from enhancing shareholder value. Moreover, 
founding families may pursue actions that maximize their personal utility, serving family 
interests, instead of profit maximization (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2000). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that one big cost of concentrated family ownership 
arises when unqualified family members run the firm. Several other reasons are aimed to 
explain the FF lower performance than NFF (Gedajlovic et al., 2012), such as the 
expropriation of wealth by inside family owners from minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 
2002), the misallocation of resources (Morck and Yeung, 2003), the inefficient allocation of 
resources (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006), and the feeling of obligation one family member 
feels to aid another at a time of need (Villalonga and Amit, 2010). 
Analyzing a sample of Canadian firms, Morck et al. (1988) find that heirs and founders 
are outperformed by widely held corporations, which is in agreement with the results of 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988), who find that FF have lower levels of Tobin’s Q ratio than 
their counterparts. Pérez-González (2006) uses US data from CEO successions to examine the 
impact of inherited control on firm performance. Their results suggest that heirs may be worse 
managers than outside CEOs. These results have been confirmed by Bennedsen and Nielsen 
(2010), who investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision-making and 
the consequence of this on firm performance, using a sample of Danish firms analyzed for the 
1994-2002 period. The authors found that family successions have a large negative causal 
impact on firm performance, concluding that professional and non-family CEOs provide 
extremely valuable services to the organizations they head. 
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Other studies find mixed or inconclusive results (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Claessens 
et al., 2002). Using a Bayesian approach, Block et al. (2011) find that whereas family and 
founder ownership are associated with superior performance, the results for family and 
founder management are more ambiguous. Some researchers conclude that the evidence 
concerning family firms’ performance is sensitive to the different definitions of FF (Westhead 
and Cowling, 1998; Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; Allouche et al., 2008), which could 
explain the mixed results obtained so far. 
Although there are no consensual conclusions concerning the corporate performance of 
family firms, we expect FF to have better performance levels than their counterparts. In this 
context, and in order to compare the results with previous evidence, we formulate the 
following classic hypothesis: 
H1: Family firms outperform non-family firms.  
 
2.2. Risk 
Agency theory suggests that the higher the ownership level (which is likely to occur in FF), 
the greater the alignment between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Consequently, this interest alignment between family and the firm may 
motivate the implementation of innovative ideas that stimulate growth and improve firm 
performance (Zahra, 2005), but increase business risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
that business risk, among other variables, influences firm performance. Indeed, there is broad 
evidence that firms with highly volatile operating earnings are more likely to be exposed to 
risk (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Adams and Buckle, 2003).   
As shown in the literature, managers, like individuals, tend to be risk-averse (Mehran, 
1995). The evidence that family firms are more adverse to financial risk than non-family 
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firms (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999) leads us to predict that they are also more adverse to 
operational risk. On this basis, we formulate hypothesis three: 
H2: The negative relationship between operational risk and firm performance is stronger for 
family firms than non-family firms. 
 
2.3. Employment 
There is no specific literature concerning the relationship between employment and firm 
performance. However, according to the Atkinson (1984) model, employment is associated 
with versatility and the ability to perform different functions and roles in the firm’s business 
activities. This contributes to functional flexibility, which, in our point of view, can lead to 
relatively superior performance. Lepak et al. (2003) find evidence that a greater use of 
knowledge-based employment is positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, 
Zhou (2012) finds evidence of a positive relationship between employment and profitability. 
Based on this evidence and on the institutional context effect on FF (Bhattacharya and 
Ravikumar, 2001; Burkart et al., 2003), we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: The positive relationship between employment and firm performance is stronger for 
family firms than non-family firms. 
 
2.4. Crisis 
There has been no examination of the phenomenon of performance with particular focus on 
the surrounding economic environment. Indeed, the relationship between crisis and 
performance has not yet been explored in the European context. 
In turbulent economic and market conditions, there are fewer investment 
opportunities, which can lead to relatively lower performance. Indeed, Mitton (2002) finds 
evidence of lower returns during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. 
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One characteristic of recession periods is the high volatility of share prices (Veronesi, 
1999). Moreover, investors tend to be irrational and to overreact to poor market conditions 
(Glode et al., 2010). Consequently, high volatility and investor overreaction may counteract 
the value premium of founder firms. Zhou (2012) states that during a crisis, unqualified 
management may increase costs for FF, which diminishes more the FF than the NFF 
performance. In addition, other arguments can reinforce the assumption that the expected 
negative relationship between crisis and firm performance will be stronger for FF than NFF, 
such as the feeling of obligation the family members feel to aid another at a time of need 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2010), the bigger incentive that NFF have to take risky projects 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and the role of CEO or board members being family members or 
not. Indeed, Pérez-González (2006) and Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) find evidence that 
heirs may be worse managers than outside CEOs, concluding that professional and non-
family CEOs provide extremely valuable services to the organizations they head. Based on 
this reasoning, we formulate the last hypothesis: 
H4: The negative relationship between crisis and firm performance is stronger for family 
firms than non-family firms. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Data 
The sample consists of all the Portuguese non-financial FF and NFF listed on the Euronext 
Lisbon during the period from 1999 to 2010. The specificity of the sample period is a result of 
data availability. Data were obtained from SABI, a private database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk and complemented with additional information collected from annual company reports. 
There are 58 firms in the full sample, corresponding to 583 observations. The number of 
observations in the sample is conditioned by the size of the Portuguese stock market as well 
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as the availability of data. Given that this study aims to investigate the relationship between 
the ownership of public firms and firm performance, we consider also two research sub-
samples: the FF sub-sample of 35 firms, corresponding to 377 observations and the NFF sub-
sample of 23 firms and 206 observations.  
FF constitute about 60% of the global sample, a percentage similar to that found by 
Faccio and Lang (2002) for Portugal (60.34%). The evidence that almost 65% of the 
observations are related to FF is consistent with the evidence that family shareholders are 
common in publically traded firms (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
 
3.2. Variables and Research Model 
Because we want to examine the influence of public firms’ ownership on firm performance, 
our dependent variable is performance (PERF).  
We consider two kinds of performance: accounting performance and market 
performance. To analyze accounting performance, we use three measures: 1) the operating 
return on assets (OROA), calculated as the operating earnings divided by total assets. We use 
OROA because it is unaffected by any changes in capital structure, which determines the 
corporate tax base; 2) return on equity (ROE), computed as the ratio of net earnings to equity 
and 3) sales growth (SG), calculated as the change in the natural logarithm of sales. To 
measure market performance, and following Pérez-González (2006), we employ the market-
to-book ratio (MB), computed as the market value to the book value of the equity. We opt to 
consider MB instead of Tobin’s Q ratio, since Zhou (2012) has recently shown that Tobin’s Q 
is not an accurate measure of performance during crisis periods, because inventors tend to be 
irrational and share price volatility is high. 
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As regards independent variables, we consider the operational risk (RISK), the 
employment (EMPLOY) and market crisis (CRISIS) variables. 
Following Mishra and McConaughy (1999), we measure RISK as the standard 
deviation (calculated over the past three years) of operating income before depreciation to 
annual sales. We define EMPLOY as the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the 
firm (Zhou, 2012). In order to identify CRISIS, we consider a dummy variable which is one if 
a fiscal year is considered a year of financial recession, and zero otherwise. We assume that 
financial crisis really strikes the financial market in 2008-2010, thus, CRISIS will take the 
value one for 2008, 2009 and 2010, and zero otherwise. 
As control variables, we consider firm age (AGE), leverage (LEV) and the cost of debt 
(COST). 
Like previous studies (Bhaird and Lucey, 2009; Nunes et al., 2012), we expect a 
positive relationship between AGE, calculated as the natural logarithm of the difference 
between incorporation year and a fiscal year, and firms performance. We consider LEV as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; Chen et al., 2010). It cannot 
be predicted, a priori, the expected signal for this variable. On the one hand, it is expected a 
positive relationship between debt and performance because, according to the theory of free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986), debt is a disciplining device. On the other hand, and based on the 
assumptions of the Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), profitable 
firms have low levels of debt capital because they are able to use internal financing (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). In this context, it is expected a negative relationship between 
profitability and debt. Although some authors find a negative relation between the two 
variables (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; La Rocca et al., 2011), 
other authors question the expected relationship between them (Constantinides and Grundy, 
1989; Barclay and Smith, 1995). COST is considered as the after-tax cost of debt, calculated 
12 
 
as the ratio of interest expenses by interest-bearing short-term and long-term debt, multiplied 
by one minus the marginal tax rate. It is expected a negative relationship between the COST 
and the firms’ performance.  
In order to analyze the relationship between performance and their determinants, we 
employ the following regression model: 
ti,iti,10
ti,9ti,8ti,7ti,6ti,5
it,4ti,3ti,2ti,1ti,
ε  INDCOST β               
  LEV β AGE β  CRISIS β  EMPLOY β RISK β              
 CRISIS_FF β  EMPLOY_FF β RISK_FF β  FF β  α PERF
+++
++++++
+++++=
        
(1) 
PERF consists of the different measures of accounting and market performance already 
specified; FFi,t is a dummy variable which is one if a firm is considered a family firm, and 
zero otherwise; RISK_FF, EMPLOY_FF and CRISIS_FF are interaction terms between the 
dummy that identifies FF and the performance determinants (independent variables): RISK, 
EMPLOY and CRISIS. We consider the variables included in the interaction variables also as 
standalone variables, in order to see if the effects of these variables are statistically different 
between family and non-family firms. AGE, LEV and COST are control variables. IND are 
industry dummy variables representing the main industry sectors: 1) primary sector 
(agriculture and fishing); 2) secondary sector (manufacturing and construction); and 3) 
tertiary sector (services and commerce).  
We use pooled OLS regressions and present the standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and covariance, based on the White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors method. 
Table 1 describes the variables used in this study. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
In order to analyze whether the determinants of performance differ between expansion 
and recession periods, we split the sample in two sub-periods: before the crisis (1999-2007) 
and during the crisis (2008-2010).  
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4. Research Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the subsequent analysis 
for FF and NFF, as well as the difference in means. The last columns present the t-statistic 
and Wilcoxon Z statistics for differences in mean and median values between the two sub-
samples, respectively. We winsorize the variables at their 1 and 99 percentile levels to 
mitigate the effect of outliers. 
 (Insert Table 2 about here) 
Although FF present higher values than NFF for all the performance measures, the 
mean differences are not statistically significant, suggesting that FF do not significantly 
outperform NFF. FF are different from NFF in what concerns RISK, EMPLOY, AGE, LEV 
and COST. FF are older, have more employees, are more indebted and the cost of debt is 
higher, but present lower levels of operational risk. 
The Wilcoxon test statistics for significance of differences in medians indicate that the 
median value for the variables RISK, EMPLOY, AGE and COST are significantly different 
for FF and NFF. The median differences for OROA and LEV are statistically significant at 
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 3 shows the performance measures means before the crisis period (1999-2007) 
and during the crisis (2008-2010), as well as the differences in mean and median variables 
between the two periods, considering all the firms (Panel A), FF (Panel B) and NFF (Panel 
C). 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Panel A shows that OROA, ROE and MB differ by period. Before the crisis period, the 
firms are more profitable than in the crisis period, except for the ROE results, which suggests 
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that ROE is not an appropriate measure of firm performance. The difference in results before 
and during the crisis is due to FF (Panel B), since none of the mean differences for NFF is 
statistically significant (Panel C). Consequently, the results suggest that FF are more sensitive 
to crisis periods than NFF. 
The Wilcoxon test statistics for significance of differences in medians indicate that, with 
the exception of ROE for the global sample, the median value for all the variables are 
statistically insignificant or only significant at the 10% level, before and during crisis period, 
which suggest no major effects of outliers. 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations for the independent variables for FF (Panel A) 
and NFF (Panel B). 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
For both the sub-samples, the correlation coefficients are low (below 0.48). 
Consequently, correlation coefficients do not appear to be sufficiently large to cause concern 
about multicollinearity problems. None of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are greater 
than 10, indicating no problematic degree of collinearity. 
 
4.2. Regression estimators 
Table 5 reports the regression (1) results considering the three accounting measures of 
performance (OROA, ROE and SG) and the market performance measure (MB). The t-
statistics are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. 
 (Insert Table 5 about here) 
The best explanatory models for the relationship between the independent variables and 
the firms’ performance are the ones in which the dependent variable is the MB and the 
OROA, so we will mainly interpret these regression results. The model that presents the lower 
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R2 value is the ROE model, suggesting that ROE is not an appropriate measure of firm 
performance, which is consistent with the conclusion obtained in Table 3. 
In what concerns the MB regression, the results show that the FF coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant, giving support to the hypothesis that FF outperform NFF (H1). 
The effects of RISK, EMPLOY and CRISIS variables are not statistically different between 
family and non-family firms. Consequently, the results do not show evidence for H2, H3 and 
H4, respectively. The AGE coefficient is negative and statistically significant, which suggests 
that the older the firm, the lower the MB. 
Concerning the OROA regression results, we can see that FF do not outperform NFF, 
giving no support to H1. The variables that explain the OROA measure of performance are the 
EMPLOY, AGE and LEV. The results show a positive and significant coefficient for the 
EMPLOY variable, as expected. However, the coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero in what concerns the interaction effect between EMPLOY and family influence. Thus, 
although the variables are statistically different between family and non-family firms, the 
results do not support the hypothesis that the positive relationship between employment and 
firm performance is stronger for family firms than non-family firms (H3). As expected, the 
relationship between AGE and performance is positive. Finally, the results show that the 
higher the leverage, the lower the OROA.    
In addition, we would like to see whether the variables included in the model have 
different effects before and during the crisis, considering the market performance measure. 
In order to analyze whether the determinants of market performance differ between 
expansion and recession periods, we run a regression similar to (1), but considering the sub-
sample of FF and the interaction variables related to crisis period. Table 6 shows on the basis 
of the MB measure of performance. 
 (Insert Table 6 about here) 
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The results show that crisis affects negatively the firm performance, consistent with the 
Table 5 results. In addition, MB is negatively influenced by AGE. 
For robustness reasons, we consider some additional variables, such as the board 
independence and the firm size. Our results do not differ significantlyiii, so our main 
conclusions do not change. In addition, we vary the definition of FF in order to analyse if 
results are stable when ownership varies, considering FF as the ones with at least one 
individual or a family with more than 25% of the voting rights. Compared to Table 5 results, 
the percentage of the total variation in performance explained by the model (R2) slightly 
increases for the OROA and ROE dependent variables, and decreases for the other two (SG 
and MB), suggesting that evidence concerning FF performance is somewhat sensitive to the 
different FF definitions (Westhead and Cowling, 1998; Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; 
Allouche et al., 2008). 
 
4.3. Results discussion 
Based on Table 2 results, we can see that although the FF present higher mean values for all 
the performance measures, the differences between the performance means of FF and NFF are 
not statistically significant. Consequently, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that FF 
outperform NFF (H1). These results are consistent with others that are inconclusive (Khanna 
and Rivkin, 2001; Claessens et al., 2002; Block et al., 2011; Zhou, 2012). Consequently, our 
evidence does not provide significant enough results, suggesting that the evidence concerning 
family firm performance might be sensitive to the different definitions of performance as well 
as sensitive to the definition of FF (Westhead and Cowling, 1998; Maury, 2006; Miller et al., 
2007; Allouche et al., 2008).  
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The higher level of EMPLOY can be associated with the bigger size of firms (it might 
be a surrogate for size) as well as with the higher level of operational risk, influenced by high 
personnel costs.  
The empirical evidence that FF are more indebted than NFF is in line with the evidence 
of Pindado and Torre (2008), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) and Setia-Atmaja (2010), but 
contrary to the results of Mishra and McConaughy (1999) and Allouche et al. (2008). The 
evidence that FF are more dependent on lenders than NFF might be explained by the lower 
level of risk for FF, which allows for higher levels of debt. In addition, older business owners 
tend to present lower levels of preference for equity (Romano et al., 2000), and, in our 
sample, FF are indeed older. This may also suggest that FF are less concerned about financial 
risk, since their cost of debt is higher, but are more concerned with maintaining their control 
over the firm than their counterparts (Pindado and Torre, 2008). Finally, FF might use debt as 
a substitute for independent directors (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Setia-Atmaja, 2010). 
Table 3 results suggest that FF are more sensitive to crisis periods than NFF. In 
addition, it seems that ROE present some difficulties as a performance indicator (Martínez et 
al., 2007). One possible explanation for the difference of OROA and ROE accounting 
measures before and during crisis might be the associated with the FF’s enhanced ability to 
generate higher operational earnings but its lower capacity to generate financial earnings, 
which is related to a weaker financial performance. Indeed, FF are more indebted and have 
higher debt costs, which is associated with the higher interest expenses and lower net 
earnings, used to calculate ROE. One reason that might explain the market measure (MB) 
performance results is associated with the fact that market measures are mainly driven by the 
market price of shares (Zhou, 2012). High volatility of share price is one of the characteristics 
of recession periods (Veronesi, 1999). In addition, investors are prone to be irrational and 
overreact to poor market conditions during recessions (Glode et al., 2010). Consequently, 
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during crisis period, share prices are undervalued and MB declines. Indeed, we calculate the 
average monthly return volatility of the sample, finding that during the crisis period (2008-
2010), the volatility of monthly returns is higher than in the rest of the sample period, which 
is in agreement with the arguments above.  
Although the lower levels of the correlation coefficients (Table 4) do not cause concern 
about multicollinearity problems, the negative correlation between COST and LEV for FF 
and the very low correlation coefficient for NFF is somewhat strange. However, it might be 
associated with the weight of interest-bearing debt that results in interest expenses and the 
other liabilities, free of expenses. 
The evidence that one of the regression models (Table 5) with higher R2 is the one in 
which the dependent variable is MB, together with the Table 2 results (although not 
statistically significant, the higher t-value for the mean differences is for the MB variable), 
indicates that the market performance (MB) is the measure that best explains firm 
performance.  
Considering the market performance measure, we find evidence for the hypothesis that 
FF outperform NFF (H1), which is in line with previous studies (Andersen and Reeb, 2003; 
Sraer and Thesmar, 2007; Allouche et al., 2008; Scholes et al., 2012). However, in relation to 
the accountability measures, the results are consistent with others that are inconclusive 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Zhou, 2012). Consequently, our evidence does not provide significant 
enough results, suggesting that the evidence concerning family firm performance is sensitive 
to the different definitions of performance. 
The AGE coefficient shows a negative relationship between age and performance. 
Although it does not have the expected signal, one possible reason might be the life cycle of 
firms. Older firms are more likely to be in the maturity phase, with lower levels of growth 
opportunities, and, consequently, with lower levels of market performance. 
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Concerning the accounting performance measures, the best model is the one in which 
the dependent variable is OROA. Regarding employment, the results show a positive and 
significant relationship between EMPLOY and OROA, suggesting that employment 
contributes to enhancing FF performance, which is in agreement with the results of Lepak et 
al. (2003) and Zhou (2012). This evidence might be associated with better skills to perform 
the requisite functions and roles in the firm’s business activities, contributing to functional 
flexibility, and consequently, to higher levels of performance (Atkinson, 1984). The results do 
not show a positive relationship between EMPLOY and OROA for FF, not giving support to 
H3. However, we must be cautious when interpreting this result, because the employment 
variable might be a surrogate for size, not detecting a supposed higher implication of FF in 
the human resource management area. 
AGE positively influences performance, which is in accordance with the evidence that 
older firms are more able to obtain higher levels of performance (Bhaird and Lucey, 2009; 
Nunes et al. (2012). 
In what concerns the LEV coefficient, the results show a negative effect of debt on firm 
performance, which is in agreement with previous studies, such as those by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Martínez et al. (2007)  and La Rocca et al. 
(2011) and gives support to the Pecking Order Theory.  
Considering the ROE performance measure, the coefficient on RISK shows that the 
higher the operational risk, the lower the profitability. The evidence that firms with high 
volatility of operating earnings are more likely to be exposed to risk (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Adams and Buckle, 2003) may explain our results showing a 
negative impact of RISK on performance. However, the coefficient on RISK considering the 
interaction effect between RISK and FF is positive, showing a different effect of RISK on 
ROE between FF and NFF.  
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Finally, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that market performance is negatively 
affected by crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion  
This study investigates the relationship between the ownership of Portuguese public firms and 
both accounting and market performance, by comparing family and non-family firms using 
data for the period 1999 to 2010.  
Overall, the empirical results suggest that FF outperform NFF, but only as regards the 
MB performance measure, which proposes that founding family presence is positively related 
to market performance. However, for accounting performance, the results do not provide 
support for the hypothesis that FF perform better than NFF. Consequently, our evidence does 
not provide significant enough results, suggesting that the evidence concerning family firm 
performance is sensitive to the different definitions of performance used. 
Compared to their NFF counterparts, FF are more indebted and older, with higher debt 
costs and present lower levels of risk. The results show that family firms are more dependent 
on lenders than non-family companies, which is consistent with the evidence of Pindado and 
Torre (2008), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) and Setia-Atmaja (2010).  
Before the crisis period, the firms were more profitable than in the crisis period, 
excluding the ROE results, which suggest that ROE is not an appropriate ratio for measuring 
firm performance (Martínez et al., 2007). In addition, the CRISIS effect on performance is 
stronger for FF than NFF. 
The evidence does not support the hypotheses that the negative relationship between 
performance and operational risk as well as crisis, and the positive relationship between 
performance and employment is stronger for family firms than non-family firms. 
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Finally, the results suggest some differences in the market measure performance before 
and during the crisis period, being the MB negatively influenced by crisis and by AGE. 
Our study has some limitations. First, the sample is of small size, which is inherent to 
the small size of Portuguese capital market. Second, the analysed period is limited to the data 
availability. Third, the definition of family firms could influence the results.  
In future research, we would like to analyse whether the performance is driven by 
family firms or founder let firms. Previous literature argues that family involvement in terms 
of ownership, management and control may not be enough to explain how families contribute 
to their business (Zellweger et al., 2010). In this context, we would like to consider several 
dimensions of family-related social factors that create familiness (Pearson et al., 2008), 
focusing on the family aspect of familiness (Zellweger et al., 2010). 
In addition, we would like to explore whether family firms differ from non-family firm 
in what concerns their main purposes. Family firms might have goals that are not necessarily 
the firms’ growth and the wealth maximization (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Chrisman et 
al., 2009). Moreover, it will be interesting to see if public FF performance differs from their 
private counterparts. The former are market-oriented, so they need to respond to the market 
(shareholders, analysts and investors), which focuses on performance. Consequently, public 
FF are forced to assume a more disciplined strategy. 
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i
 Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that 19% of sample firms have control enhancing mechanisms such as dual 
shares, pyramids and voting agreements and La Porta et al. (1999) find evidence of the presence of pyramid 
structures and crossholdings in countries with strong legal investor protection. 
ii
 For more detail about family ownership, management and control, see Zellweger et al. (2010). 
iii
 For simplicity and space reasons, we do not report the results. However, they are available upon request to 
authors. 
